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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent concurs in Appellant's statement of the 
nature of the case and disposition in Lower Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent prays that the Supreme Court affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant filed for divorce on September 26, 1975. 
The parties, thereafter, entered into an 0greement called 
a Stipulation, Waiver, and Property Settlement Agreement 
which was drafted by Plaintiff's attorney. This document 
was substantially adopted in the divorce decree entered 
by Judge Stewart M. Hansen on November 7, 1975. In the 
agreement the parties agreed that the Defendant would have 
custody of the minor child and that the Respondent would 
also get the family car and the equity in the family home, 
subject to the Respondent assuming the payments on the 
home. Because the Appellant was a full time student at 
the time of the divorce, his monthly financial obligations 
were minimal. The Respondent was awarded no alimony and 
child support was set at"$50.00 per month for the care 
and support of the parties' minor child, Michele, during the 
period that the Plaintiff was continuing his university 
education and $150.00 per month upon his employment ••. ". 
Record p. 19, paragraph 10. 
The agreement contained numerous. other provisions Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
including extensive property settlement terms which are 
not relevant to this appeal. 
The Appellant paid $50.00 per month as child sup-
port until September 1979 when he increased his payments 
to $100.00 per month pursuant to a stipulation of the 
parties and an order signed by J'udge Christine M. Durham 
on September 27, 1979. (Record p. 55). This change in support 
amount by stipulation of the parties came after the time in 
question on this appeal. 
Beginning in August of 1975 the Respondent and the 
parties' minor child received public assistance from the 
State of Utah and continued receiving assistance until May 
of 1979. (Record p. 70). As required by law, the Respon-
dent executed an assignment of her rights to collect 
child support from the Appellant to the State of Utah. 
(Record p. 38). 
On October 4, 1979 the State of Utah was granted an 
ex parte motion to join as a party to the action, (record 
p. 57), for the purpose of pursuing Appellant, according 
to Divorce Decree, for reimbursement of welfare provided 
to his child. 
The following facts are relevant to the amount of 
support owed by Appellant pursuant to Divorce Decree since 
the Divorce Decree based the amount upon whether the 
Appellant was a full time student or working full time. 
The Appellant attended university classes at the 
-2-
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University of Utah full time Autumn Quarter 1975, Winter 
Quarter 1976, Spring Quarter 1976. (Record p. 96 Lines 
7-22). Appellant testified that he only attended one 
quarter in 1977 ~nd only returned for one quarter in 
Winter 1978. (Record p. 106 Lines 13-22). That was the last 
time he attended classes and he has not yet completed his 
degree, although he has been a student from 1971 to 1980. 
(Record p. 96, 97). He is no longer majoring in pharmacy and 
intends to pursue a degree in business. (~ecord p. 98). 
In February 1978 the Appellant began full time employment 
with the post office. (Record p. 97). 
On April 9, 1980, Appellant came before the Court on 
an Order to Show Cause why he should not pay the additional 
$100.00 per month child support arrearages, pursuant to the 
Divorce Decree. This Order to Show Cause was instituted 
by the State of Utah and the purpose of the hearing was to 
determine if the Plaintiff was a student or employed during 
the time in which the Respondent and the child were receiving 
public assistance, and thus, whether the Appellant should 
pay the increased support amount of $150.00 rather than the 
$50.00 per month. The Court found, based on testimony at 
p. 106 Line 13-22, that the Appellant was not a fulltime student 
and was employed as contemplated in the Divorce Decree for 
thirty five of the forty six months that the Respondent and 
the child were on public assistance. (Record p. 107). The Court 
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also found after Appellant's testimony, that the Divorce 
Decree contemplated that the Appellant had to be a full 
time student to avail himself of the lower child support 
provisions and that intermittent study would not be enough 
to allow him to retain the lower child support status. 
(Record p. 107). Based on these findings, the Court ordered 
the Appellant to pay $100.00 per month for 35 months of 
back child support. This represented the difference between 
the $150.00 per month child support decreed during periods 
of Appellant's employment and the $50.00 per month actually 
paid by Appellant. 
ARGUMENT - POINT 1 
The trial court had sufficient evidence, based on the 
Appellant's testimony, before it to support the judgment and 
its judgment should not be overturned on appeal. 
The Court which heard this matter was a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. In a divorce case the trial court 
has broad powers and the trial court's decision will not be 
overturned on appeal unless the Appellant shows some mani-
fest error or abuse of discretion. Eastman vs Eastman 
558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976); Curry vs Curry 321 P.2d 939, 
7U.2d 198 (1958). 
The primary issue the trial court had before it 
was whether the Appellant had been a full time student 
during the time period in which the minor child was re-
ceiving support from the state. Under the terms of the 
-4-
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Divorce Decree, the Appellant was to pay "$50.00 per month 
for the care and support of the parties' minor child, 
Michele, during the period that the Plaintiff is continuing 
his university education and $150.00 per month upon 
his employment". (Record p. 19) Appellant took the po-
sition that so long as he attended the university one quarter 
a year and was not employed full time he was only obligated 
to pay $50.00 per month as child support. The Court rejec-
ted this argument, (record p. 107) and fou41:J that Appellant 
was obligated to pay $150.00 per month as child support 
every month that he was not a full time student, in :pursuit 
of a normal 4 year or 5 year degree. (Record p. 107) . 
The State of Utah is a party to this action because 
it provided support for the Appellant's minor child at a 
time when Appelant was not adequately providing for her 
support. When the State of Utah provided support for 
the child it became subrogated to the child's rights of 
support and could enforce the Decree to the same extent 
as could the child herself. UCA 78-45b-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45-9, State Department of Social Services 
vs Clark 554 P.2d 1310 (1976). 
In determining the Appellant's liability for past 
child support the Court had before it the Affidavits of the 
attorney for the State which included a sununary of the 
amounts expended by the Department of Social Services for 
_,_.:, .-:3 
...... ~----n...-t during the period in question. Also, 
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Affidavits with an Order to Show Cause are commonly accep-
ted practice in this jurisdiction to set forth the account-
ing as to Divorce Decree ordered amounts and payments 
made. Affidavits are admissible in evidence as an 
exception to the hearsay rule to the extent permitted by 
the statute and rules of procedure of the State.(Utah Rules 
of Evidence Rule 63(2)). Under Rule 43(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure a motion based on facts not appearing 
of record may be heard on affidavits, unless the court 
directs otherwise. 
The Appellant was present in court with counsel on 
the day in which the motion was heard. Appellant could have 
objected to the use of affidavits but he failed to do so. 
Now he is arguing on appeal that he was prejudiced by his 
inability to cross examine the person who kept the records. 
It is a well settled rule of law that a party's failure to 
raise an objection in an earlier proceeding constitutes 
a waiver of the objection and he is estopped from raising 
the objection on appeal. Sanders vs Cassity 586 P.2d 423 
(Utah 1978}. Counsel must give the trial court an oppor-
tunity to correct the error before akking the Appelate Court 
to overturn the judgment. Porcupine Resevoir vs Lloyd 
W. Keller Corp 392 P.2d 620, 15 U.2d 318 (1964). 
The cases cited by the Appellant in his brief are 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Santee vs North 
574 P.2d 191 Kansas 1977) the parties objected to the 
-6-
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examination and specifically asked for the right to cross 
examine the witness and the Judge refused to permit cross 
examination. No objection of any kind was made to the 
use of affidavits int he instant case. Aylor vs Aylor 
478 P.2d 302 (Colo 1970) cited by Appellant actually 
supports the position of Respondent because the Court in 
that case allowed the written reports of psychiatrists to 
be used as evidence in a child custody case without the 
benefit of cross-examination because the rarties waived 
objections. The losing party then appealed on the grounds 
that he had been denied due process and the Appellate Court 
rejected these contentions because the Appellant had 
waived his objections to the use of written reports and could 
not complain on appeal. By failing to object to the Af-
fidavit at the hearing on the motion, Appellant has also 
waived his objections and should not be allowed to complain 
for the first time on appeal. 
The Affidavit lists child support payments made 
to the minor child. (Record p. 64). Although it is pos-
sible that there is some confusion in Appellant's mind as 
to who was supported by these amounts, because of the title 
of Exhibit "B", the amounts listed are less than the standard 
amount paid out by the State for the support of one child 
during the appropriate periods of time. Appellant knew 
that the child was receiving public assistance through the 
"Stepfather's Assistance Program" (Brief p. 10), and could 
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easily understand that because his wife had remarried, the 
State was only providing assistance for the child. If he 
had truly been interested in finding out whether any of 
these sums were going toward the support of his ex-wife, 
he could have either:!) raised an objection to the Affidav-
its at trial,or 2) contacted the Department of Social 
Services for an explanation. Either of these actions would 
have made it clear to the Appellant that the only funds 
listed in the Affidavit were funds expended for the child. 
Appellant however, has attempted to confuse the 
issue by bringing up the subject of alimony. Alimony was 
not discussed at the hearing on the order to show cause. 
Appellant did not object to the use of the Affidavits at 
the hearing or request an explanation of the disbursements. 
The issue is raised only on appeal in an attempt to con-
fuse the issue and overturn a judgment which was adverse 
to the Appellant's interests. 
The Court should not be diverted, however, from the 
main issue, which was before the trial court, i.e., whether 
or not Appellant was complying with the terms of the 
Divorce Decree. If he was not complying with the Decree any 
party to the action - the Respondent, the child, or the 
State of Utah - could bring an action to enforce the 
Decree according to its terms. Utah Code Annotated 78-45b-3 
Bartholomew vs Bartholomew 548 P.2d 239 ( 1976 ). The fact 
that the State had provided public assistance is relevant 
-8-
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only in that it allows the State to enter an appearance 
as a party to the action. The amount of assistance provided 
by the State is a minor issue which becomes important 
only if the Court found that the Appellant was not complying 
with the Decree and then only if the ~~aunt recovered 
from the l\ppellant through the Order to Show Cause exceeds 
the amount the State expended for the child. Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45b-3(5). 
An Affidavit is perfectly good evidence where,· as 
here, the issue addressed by the Affidavit is of minor 
importance (accounting statement), or when objections to 
its admissibility are waived, or when the outcome is not 
directly dependant on the Affidavit. Lee Wayne Co Inc vs 
Pruitt 550 P.2d 1374 (Okla 1976). The Appellant waived his 
objections by failing to raise them at the proper time. 
What's more, the issue addressed by the Affidavit is only 
collateral to the main issue which is: Was the Defendant in 
complj_ance with the Divorce Decree·? 
The Court's interpretation of the language of the 
Divorce Decree is entirely proper. The Decree was based 
on an agreement between the parties which was drafted by 
the Appellant and his attorney. They picked the language 
which was used in the provision regarding child suppcrt and 
they wrote the agreement regarding the property settlement 
of which the Appellant now complains. In the case of 
Skousen vs Smith 493 P.2d 1003, 27 U.2d 169 (1972) Justice 
-9-
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Henriod said, 
..• In~addition to this, the fact persists 
that the document which Defendant now 
urges did not mean what it says, was 
drafted and executed by the Defendant. It is 
axiomatic that language in a written 
instrument is interpreted more strongly 
against a scrivener who executes it. It is 
equally elementary that parties may be 
bound by the language they deliberately 
use in their contracts, irrespective of 
the fact that it appears to result in im-
providence, beyond perhaps in excess of 
what the mythical prudent man might feel 
constrained to venture. The freedom of 
contract is not reserved to the more-than-
average intelligent, but to the less for-
tunate less-than-average brother. It is 
only where their contracts are carried into 
the domain of equity on a· raft of un-
consciounability so laden with shockingness 
as to justify the Chancellor in sinking both 
that the sanctity of contracts should be 
molested" at p. 1005. 
The Court interpreted the language of the agreement 
and the Divorce Decree according to its common everyday 
usage. The Court interpreted the language against the 
party who was responsible for it. The Trial Court's action 
was entirely proper and this Court should not overturn it 
on appeal. Skousen vs Smith supra. 
Once the trial Court has interpreted the Divorce 
Decree it had the factual task of determining whether the 
Appellant had complied with the Decree. The Court found 
that the Appellant was not attending school on a full time 
continuing basis, that he had been employed, and that he 
was not in compliance with the Decree. Since he was not in 
compliance with the Decree he owed child support for his 
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daughter Michele Black at the rate of $100.00 per month 
for each of the months in which he did not comply with the 
Divorce Decree. The State of Utah was the Trustee of the 
cause of action belonging to Sonya Black and had the power 
{UCA 78-45-9) to bring the action and receive and cash 
any payments received as a result of that action, Utah 
Code Annotated78-45-b-3{1) {5)and (6). The Court acted 
within its powers in determining the factual issues presented. 
The Court acted legally in awarding the jndgment for back 
child support to the State Department of Social Services. 
The issues of Affidavits is a collateral issue which was 
of little relevance to the outcome of the case and to 
which the Appellant did not even object at the hearing. 
The trial court acted within its powers and there is no 
manifest error or abuse of discretion in its actions 
which justifies overturning the verdict. Eastman vs Eastman 
558 P.2d 514 {Utah 1976) 
POINT II 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that the Appellant did not comply with the Divorce 
Decree. 
In the Divorce Decree the Court took into account 
at that time, the fairness of the property division agree-
ments of the parties and gave the stipulated provision 
the Court's approval. At the time the Court set child 
support, it had in mind the division of property between the 
-11-
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parties. Soon after the Decree was entered the Appellant 
filed a motion to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the 
grounds that the Appellant did not feel he was treated 
fairly. (Record p.21). This motion was denied. (Record 
p.44 and 45). In the hear~n~ on the order to show cause the 
Appellant tried to relitigate the issue of the fairness 
of the property settlement and the court sustained Respon-
dent's objection that the testimony was irrelavant to the 
issue of whether the Appellant had complied with the Decree 
of Divorce (Record p. 100 and 101). The Appellant brings 
the issue up on appeal again, pages 9 and 10 of his brief. 
No matter how bitterthe~Defendant may feel about his lot, 
the matter has been litigated and was not in issue in 
these proceedings. 
The issue of Appellant's obligation to provide child 
support was also raised again in the Order to Show Cause 
proceedings. However, the Order to Show Cause hearing was 
a proceeding to determine whether the Appellant had complied 
with the Decree of Divorce in the past, not a proceeding 
for modification of the Decree. Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-45-7 which is cited by Appellant deals with prospective 
support, not arrearages. Therefore, the living conditions, 
wealth, material, change in circumstances etc., were not 
relevant in this hearing and the Court was not required to 
take them into account because child support obligations 
become unalterable as they come due. Larsen vs Larsen 561 P.2d 
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1077 (1977). If the Appellant had experienced a material 
change of circumstances he could have petitioned the Court 
for a modification of the support order many years before 
he was hauled into Court on an order to show cause and could 
have avoiqed the accr4al of arrearages. However, the Appel-
lant did not do this. Instead, although he was working full 
time and not attending school on a full time continuing basis, 
he now wants the court to effect a retroactive modification 
of his support obligation. This the court cannot do, and the 
Court acted properly in determining that he was not in 
compliance with the Decree. Larsen vs Larsen supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant had a full and fair hearing on the mat-
ter and the Court, having heard all of the evidence that 
the Appellant desired to present, ruled that the Appellant 
had not complied with the Divorce Decree. The Court found 
that the Appellant was delinquent in an amount of $3,500 
and entered judgment in favor of the State of Utah as 
Trustee of the cause of action of Respondent Sonya Black 
Heitman and the Appellant's minor child. 
The fact that Appellant desires to have his child 
supported by the tax payers of the State of Utah and to 
avoid paying the Court ordered amount of support, is not 
sufficient to warrant the relief requested by the Appel-
lant. The issue of the fairness of the property settlement 
has been litigated several times and decided against Ap-
-13-
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pellant. The Court has examined the Divorce Decree and 
found that it did not give the Appellant the right to avoid 
child cupport payments when he attended classes at the 
university only one quarter a year on a non-fulltirne 
basis. 
Appellant and his attorney drafted the Decree which 
has caused the Appellant so much grief, Appellant has 
persistently tried to relitigate his problems before various 
courts, he now tries to get this Court to overturn a sound and 
well reasoned judgment with argument of an alleged 
defect in a collateral matter to which the Appellant did not 
even object in the Court below. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm 
the decision of the Court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County 
ENIS KROLL 
ty County Attorn y 
orneys for ·nefendant-Responc 
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